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ABSTRACT
There is general consensus in the strategy literature that successful firms alter
strategy to address changes in their environments and enact more favourable
conditions. Studies of organizational change suggest that this adjustment is not
always made in a timely manner. Different beliefs about cause and effect have
been established as a plausible explanation for differential responses to environ-
mental change. This exploratory study of six pharmaceutical firms suggests more
specifically that multiple concepts associated with environmental changes must be
directly linked to organizational performance before new strategies are initiated.
The results emphasize the importance of stress as a precursor to strategic
response and have implications for the way we conceptualize 'response' wben
referring to significant changes in strategy.
INTRODUCTION
One fundamental normative prescription is consistent throughout almost all of
the strategy literature: firm strategists must continually monitor the environment
and make strategic decisions that keep firm strengths aligned with new opportu-
nities and threats in the environment (Andrews, 1987; Ginsberg, 1988; Miles and
Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1978; Porter, 1980; Quinn, 1980; Hofer and Schendel,
1978). Research has demonstrated that firms changing strategy in response to
changes in the environment outperform those that maintain current strategies in
the face of new circumstances (Haveman, 1992; Smith and Grimm, 1987).
Further, the evidence suggests that firms failing to adjust in a timely fashion may
enter a downward spiral from which they do not escape (Cameron et al., 1988;
Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988).
Despite the obvious benefits of adjusting strategy to meet the changing
demands of the environment, a number of recent articles point out that it is
often difficult or impossible for firms to change strategy (Miles and Snow, 1978;
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Miller and Friesen, 1984; Oster, 1982; Schwenk and Tang, 1989; Tushman and
Romanelli, 1985; Zajac and Shortell, 1989). For example, limitations on strategie
change have been attributed to established commitments (Monteverde and
Teece, 1982; Thompson, 1967), the existence of buffering organizational slack
(Chakravarthy, 1982; Cyert and March, 1963), and the development of standard
operating procedures (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). It Ls therefore not surprising
to note that firms in profoundly changing environments and/or firms with signif-
icantly deteriorating performance vary significantly in the timing of their attempts
to alter strategy (Ginsberg and Buchholtz, 1990; Haveman, 1992; Miles and
Snow, 1978; Miles, 1982; Smith and Grimm, 1987).
The question that interests us is why some firms are able to overcome the
forces of inertia more quickly than others, and we begin with the assumption
that the timing of strategic adjustment is significantly affected by top managers'
interpretation of the environment's impact on the firm. Researchers have
proposed that environmental interpretation affects action through such precursors
to action as problem definition (Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; Mintzberg et al., 1976)
and strategic issue diagnosis (Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Dutton et al., 1983).
Dutton and Duncan specifically suggest that ' . . . a major reason organizations
respond differently to changes in the environment involves how strategic issues
are triggered and interpreted by decision makers' (p. 279). We follow this line of
reasoning, and discover that perceived connections between the environment and
the firm explain differences in the timing of strategic response.
The paper addresses three issues in sequence. First, it pulls together several
theoretic arguments needed to address the timing issue. Second, it reviews the
methodological issues that have to be addressed before the details of timing can
be explored. It then presents empirical evidence of interpretive distinctions
among six pharmaeeutical companies that differed by up to five years in their
response to new regulatory change.
THE UNK BETWEEN MANAGERIAL INTERPRETATION AND STRATEGIC CHANGE
The effect of interpretation on firm adaptation to changes in the environment
has enjoyed increased empirical attention since Weick's (1979) statement that the
environment is not an objective 'thing' to be known, but rather the product of
interpretation and action. Interpretation has been found to affect the response of
hospitals to a doctors' strike (Meyer, 1982), the revision of basic philosophical
and theological principles by a religious order (Bartunek, 1984), university
reaction to a drop in the number of available 18 year olds (Milliken, 1990), the
passage of new patient care regulations by mental hospitals (Scheid-Cook, 1992),
and response to crisis in the Finnish banking industry (Myllys, 1994).
These five studies share certain similarities. Each looks at firm response to a
significant event in the environment, an event that was expected to affect the
strategic behaviour of all firms in the sample. Despite the similarity of the organi-
zations studied, however, the response of each to the extemal changes varied
significantly (with the exception of Bartunek's study of a single organization). Each
author concludes that variability in the content or certainty of strategic response
could be attributed to variations in interpretation about the environment.
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These interesting studies also raise issues that are problematic for relating
interpretation and change. First, the studies vary in their explicit recognition of
the cognitive processes involved in interpreting new events. Second, each (with
the exception of Myllys, 1994) does not explicitly address level of analysis issues
that are automatically raised when one applies an individual level concept, such
as interpretation, to organization level behaviour. Third, they do not adequately
account for why some organizations are more quickly impressed by environmen-
tal change than others. Further understanding requires that these issues be
brought together in the same theoretic account. In the following discussion, we
address each of these issues individually and then bring them together in a single
model of interpretation and strategic change that we then use to guide our
empirical study.
Schematic Frameworks as the Basis for Interpreting the Environmmt
The processes of noticing and interpredng stimuli have been linked by cognitive
scientists to schemas the individual has already formulated (Fiske and Taylor,
1991; Neisser, 1967). 'Schemas' and other related concepts (frames, mental
models) identify the simplified and abstracted representations individuals use to
make sense of and act within their environments (Gioia and Sims, 1986; Kelly,
1955; Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1980; Walsh, 1995; Weick and Bougon, 1986).
A schema is a set of interrelated, largely unquestioned assumptions that high-
lights certain characteristics of new stimtili and establishes the grounds for cate-
gorizing them as similar to or different from those encountered before (Fiske and
Taylor, 1991). Nisbett and Ross (1980), for example, found that when ques-
tioned, individuals will recall elements of a stimulus that are most salient in their
mental models, while ignoring other characteristics that are not central to that
general frame. Researchers interested in organizational contexts also suggest that
individuals pay greater attention to occurrences that support their existing
assumptions (Hedberg et al., 1976) and then act to confirm diese beliefs (Kiessler
and SprouU, 1982). Stimuli that can't be placed within existing frameworks may
generate new schema, but tbis is a time-consuming and uncertain process.
Starbuck and Milliken (1988) note that the belief systems held by managers
regarding what is important in the environment are more likely to push informa-
tion that might indicate the need for new schemata to the background of
attention where they are unlikely to be acted upon.
The basic concept of schema has been very useful to researchers concerned
with the complex, confusing and ambiguous settings that characterize most orga-
nizations (Allison, 1971; March and Simon, 1958). Schematic frameworks have
been proposed as critical simplifying and sensemaking mechanisms that allow the
individual to make sense of stimuli-rich contexts and act within them (Daft and
Weick, 1984; Kiesler and Sprotill, 1982). The proposition that managers hold
schematic frameworks related to their firms has been empirically illustrated by
several authors. Extensive work by Colin Eden and colleagues (e.g. Eden et al.,
1979, 1983), for example, uses cognitive mapping techniques to uncover
schematic frameworks of several different organizational concepts held by
managers at different organizations. Importandy, this work highlights the fact
that interpretations or beliefs about the environment are highly subjective and
often idiosyncratic. It is these idiosyncrasies, or differences in schematic frame-
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works that we suggest accounts for much of the diversity in timing of response to
significant environmental changes. Before such a proposal can be investigated,
however, it is necessary to move this individual-based concept to the level of the
organization.
Beyond the Indimduat Shared Schematic Frameworks as the Basis for Co-ordinated Activity
Researchers interested in linking firm response to the environment to cognitive
processes typically treat 'the firm' as if it were a unitary actor noticing changes
in its situation, and thus draw directly upon the kind of cognitive arguments just
cited. This practical simplification is problematic, of course, because cognition is
an attribute of individuals. One way out of the conundrum is to consider the
absolute necessity of common schematic frameworks for achieving co-ordinated
action. Several interesting lines of inquiry outside of the management field
emphasize the necessity of shared belief and interpretation as the basis for social
behaviour. These streams of research also suggest how commonalities that
support eoUective activity come about. For example, an interest in the source ol
scientific discovery led Kuhn (1970) to define scientific communities on the basis
of a shared paradigmatic fi-amework. This work emphasizes the importance of
shared understanding for defining the most important scientific work to be
pursued. Kuhn points to professional training, established procedures, compelling
experiments, and fonnal and informal interaction among scientists as the means
of establishing and solidifying common assumptions.
An analogous line of reasoning in political science investigates the development
of 'epistemic communities' {Haas, 1992). This work is driven by an interest in
understanding how new policies (e.g. monetary reform or environmental protec-
tion) are developed by government agencies. Peter Haas su^ests that such
groups have: . .
(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, that provide a value-
based radonale for the social action of community members;
(2) shared causal beliefs, that are derived from their analysis of practices
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between
possible policy actions and desired outcomes;
(3) shared notions of validity - that is, intersubjective, intemally defined
criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their
expertise; and
(4) a common policy enterprise - that is, a set of common practices associated
with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed,
presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as
a consequence. (Haas, 1992, p. 3)
These and other works are convincing testimony for the necessity of shared
understanding to accomplish co-ordinated social tasks. The possibility of co-ordi-
nation is what leads to social organization in the first place (Barnard, 1938) and
there are strong philosophical arguments that extensive commonalities are
necessary for any kind of social exchange (Gilbert, 1989; Kelly, 1955). The con-
sequence for the organization is that 'organizational cognition cannot be seen as
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an individualised act, but rather as an "inseparable aspect" (Lave and Wenger,
1991) of the continual, local negotiation and re-negodadon of meanings between
actors' (Wood, 1996, p. 1). Thus, organization cognition is a reciprocal concept,
in which the individual's interpretation is shaped by the organization and other
social contexts, but that cognition is simultaneously creating context (Weick,
1979). There is room for individual differences, but patterns emerge from the
whole (Allard Poesi, 1994; Ehlinger, 1994; Fid, 1994; Stjemberg and UUstad,
1994).
The underlying assumption of this paper is that organizations, and especially
the top management team of organizations, must be 'epistemic communities' of
some strength in order to be viable economic units. While individuals continue to
have unique beliefs and interpretations, they share many beliefs and understand-
ing with others (Bougon et al., 1977; Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994). To the
extent that beliefs are shared by key actors, the resulting shared schematic frame-
works simplify a complex world and provide the basis for co-ordinated activity.
Similar structures have been labelled 'shared understanding' (March, 1991),
'cognitive consensuality' (Gioia and Sims, 1986), 'dominant logic' (Prahalad and
Bettis, 1986), or shared 'strategic frames' (Huff, 1982) within the organization.
In sum, the cognitive psychology literature suggests that the processes of
noticing and interpreting stimuli are directed by cognitive structures called
schema. We extend this concept to the organizational level by recognizing the
necessity of some level of shared understanding to conduct co-ordinated activity.
We term these shared belief systems 'shared schematic frameworks'. In the
following secdon we address the issue of why some firms appear to be more
quickly impressed by environmental change by ititroducing the concepts of stress
and inertia.
Stress Opposing Inertia as the Explanation for Timing D^erences
Anomalous stimuli that capture attention but cannot easily be interpreted
or responded to in terms of past experience are stressful. At the individual
level, new life experiences (marriage, job change, divorce, etc.) have long been
recognized as stimuli (Holmes and Rahe, 1967) that are likely to call into
question the validity or usefiUness of past schema. The range of positive and/or
negative emotion attached to such events raises their salience and helps trigger
new understanding. On the other hand, schematic frameworks are remarkably
resilient. Experiments by Ross and his associates (Anderson et al., 1980;
Ross et al., 1975), for example, show that people can persist in explanations
even when shown that the evidence they relied on to form those explanations is
false.
We believe such accounts of individual cognitive processes are consistent with
theoretical assessments of stress and inertia at the organization level (Bigelow,
1982; Ginsberg, 1988; HufT et al., 1992; Olivia et al., 1988; Tushman and
Romanelli, 1985). Recent work has emphasized the many factors that help
maintain organization activity in the face of environmental change. The general
argument is that many impediments to change are a result of deliberate attempts
to establish relationships and develop structures and routines that institutionalize
beneficial ways of acting (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Selznick, 1957). The more
successful these past adaptations have been, the less likely significant departure
© BlackweU Publisher Ltd 1997
342 PAMELA S. BARR AND ANNE S. HUFF
from current ways of acting becomes (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Ginsberg and
Buchholtz, 1990; Powell and Dimaggio, 1991). In addition to affecting organiza-
tional activities, these organizational and institutional forces of inertia are likely
to affect the processes of noticing and interpretation (Meyer, 1982; Milliken,
1990). For example, external institutional norms may blind managers to the need
to change by emphasizing conformity to a certain set of accepted interpretations,
and structural configurations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) can exacerbate lack
of managerial attention by limiting and biasing available information (Starbuck
and Milliken, 1988).
In addition to inertial forces developed to maintain status quo, there exist
forces for change that serve as organizational corollaries to individual-based
concepts of stress. As discussed above, individual stress results from stimuli that
cannot easily be addressed with past schema and behaviours. At an organization
level, stress follows from stimuli that is interpreted as challenging the appropri-
ateness of current actions and procedures. For example, new circumstances
(innovation, govemment actions, competitive moves, changing leadership, etc.)
weaken the 'fit' between an organization and its environment and thus set the
stage for calling current structures and routines into question (Andrews, 1987).
While stress can arise from direct performance downturns (an indicator that
current structures/routines are inappropriate), anticipated circumstances or new
achievements by competitors can also be perceived as stressful. These examples
of likely stressful events are taken from the strategy literature as examples of
stimuli likely to result in a questioning of the appropriateness of current activ-
ities, structures and routines. It is important to emphasize, however, that stress
is an interpretive construct; any given event or situation may be interpreted in
some organizations as stressful, and either overlooked or noticed but not
perceived as stressful in others. It is this difference in interpretation that is the
focus of attention in our empirical study, and that we propose is at least
partially responsible for diversity in the timing of response to environmental
change.
In relatively straightforward models, strategic change becomes more and more
probable ^s the stress level (pressure for change) resulting from various stimuli
exceeds the current level of inertia (pressure to maintain the status quo) (Huff et
al., 1992; Olivia et al., 1988). Of course, both individuals and firms demonstrate
the homeostatic capacity to adjust; that is, they are able to mediate stressful
events by making changes compatible with existing commitments and schematic
fi-ameworks. At this level of inertia, this capacity not only becomes a part of
existing procedures, it 'trains' individual managers to be more flexible and
adaptive in their interpretations. Adaptive capabilities thus can reduce the
impact of many stressful events, but they do not address the firm's vulnerability
to events that fall outside of previous experience. Over time, the stress associated
with noticed events that cannot be adequately responded to with current activ-
ities and procedures exceeds the ability to adjust and significant change is
required.
To this point in the paper we have discussed several issues related to taking an
interpretation-based view to the timing of strategic change. In the following
section, we combine the concepts of shared schematic frameworks and stress and
inertia into a single model of strategic change.
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A Model of Strategic Change
Figure 1 provides a general model for understanding the timing of strategic
change that incorporates work on stress and inertia with ideas of schema-based
interpretive processes. Organizations are assumed to have various formal and
informal mechanisms in place to scan their environments. These mechanisms are
more or less sensitive to bits of information that might be used to reconsider firm
wellbeing. Failure to notice potentially anomalous stimuli results in continued
routine scanning. Even if an anomaly producing event is given attention, it must
be interpreted or given meaning (Daft and Weick, 1984). Any given event is
likely to be imbued with many types of meaning. Of particular relevance to the
idea of stress/inertia and strategic change is interpretation of the likely impact (if
any) of the event on the firm. Such an interpretation may result in one of two
basic outcomes. First, the stimuli may collectively be interpreted as not having a
significant impact on the firm. In tbis case current routines/procedures are not
questioned and, thus, the event is not considered stressful. Thc level of organiza-
tional stress is not increased and scanning continues, although future events (or
input from other scanning mechanisms) may result in a reinterpretation at a
later time.
When an event is interpreted as having an impact on the firm, the pressure to
make some change in activity will increase. At this point, a second determination
Scanning
!
Nnt
Yes
•nt )
Interpretation
of impact
Affects performance
(+ stress)
Interpretation
of stress level
> inertia level
Strategic change
No
Does not affect performance
(0 stress)
< inertia level Homeostatic
change
Figure 1. An interpretive model of the strategic change process
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must be made: Is the pressure to change (level of stress) greater than the pressure
to maintain the status quo (level of inertia)? If stress is less than inertia, it is
probable that discomfort will be addressed through homeostatic adjustments in
current strategy. However, as stress exceeds inertia, strategic change is more and
more likely to occur.
We used this model as an organizing device in designing an empirical study of
timing issues. Linking interpretation to action required solving a number of
metbodological issues, which will be discussed before returning to the model and
our analysis.
STUDY DESIGN
To assess the relative capacity of firms as 'epistemic communities' to recognize
and respond to stimuli potentially indicating a need for a change, we needed to
identify a relatively homogeneous set of firms and isolate a strong, unconfounded
change in the competitive arena shared by these firms. Data had to be available
from the time period in which the event took place, and similar data had to be
available for all companies studied. Further, the firms had to be homogeneous
enough to be expected to be similarly affected by the environmental change. In
addition to these questions of study definition, we needed to establish methods
for separately identifying strategic actions and the shared schematic framework
or 'strategic frame' that might be expected to direct these activities.
The challenges of identifying environmental changes with relatively homo-
geneous effects are typically solved by looking at key events in the relatively
small number of industries dominated by single business firms (Meyer, 1982;
Scheid-Cook, 1992; Smith and Grimm, 1987). We followed this tradition by
choosing to study the US pharmaceutical industry. A long period of sustained
growth and profitability after the Second World War is evidence of a relatively
stress free environment. On the other hand, it is a regulated industry and we
were particularly drawn to the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 as an interesting example of significant environmental
change.
The Exogenous Shock of 1962 Regulatory Charge
The 1962 amendments to the Food and Drug Act were preceded by years of
govemment hearings and the introduction of several proposed regulatory
changes in both the House and Senate. The powerful Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association was able to infiuence the content of these amendments and
many observers felt they might even defeat the congressional proposals being
made in the early 1960s. However, the unexpected Thalidomide disaster in
Europe and Canada came to light in early 1962 and public concern about birth
defects caused by prescription sleeping pills (and by extension negative side-
effects of other prescription drugs) added new dimensions to the bill being
considered in Congress, considerably strengthening the provisions the drug
companies had anticipated, and hastened the bill's approval.
The bill contained many provisions, but its major impact was to add several
new phases to the drug approval process. The time the Food and Drug Adminis-
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tration (KDA) had to approve a new drug was doubled, vrith automatic exten-
sions granted to the FDA if the deadline was not met. The EDA was also given
the power to withdraw without notice approval from existing drugs if they were
found to be unsafe, lacked 'substantial' evidence of effectiveness (evidence of
effectiveness was a new requirement in itself), or contained misstated applications.
The 17-year legislated life of a drug patent begins at the time the patent is
awarded. To protect prospective new drugs from competition, patents commonly
are applied for at the time of discovery and prior to testing. The new, more
stringent testing requirements resulting from the amendments thus increased the
time and expense associated with introducing a new drug and decreased the
time available for profiting from patent protection. In fact, the time elapsing
from FDA processing dme from submission of a New Drug Application to
approval increased from 17 months in 1962 to 44 months by 1969 (Teaiin,
1980), significantly reducing the effective life of the patent.
Several subsequent trends in the industry have been attributed to these
changes in the environment. First, there was a significant decline in the number
of new drugs introduced in the United States. Between 1950 and 1961, 564 new
chemical entities (NCEs), the basis of the FDA approval and patent protection
process, were introduced. In the next eight years only 159 went through the
system. While a portion of this decrease is due to a 'knowledge plateau',
comparative studies of new drug introductions in the USA and UK suggest the
amendments also contributed significantly to the decline in new drug introduc-
tions (Grabowski et ai., 1978; WardeU, 1971).
Second, US pharmaceutical manufacturers became increasingly active
overseas. Foreign sales as a percent of total for all US manufacturers increased
steadily during the 1960s (Temin, 1980), and US firms increased their invest-
ments in overseas activities. For example, the percentage of NCEs first studied
and tested in the USA by US firms decreased from 100 per cent at the time the
amendments were enacted, to less than 80 per cent by 1970, and 50 per cent by
1974 (Lasagna and WardeU, 1975).
A third major trend in the industry following enactment of the 1962 amend-
ments was growth through diversification. Most of this activity occurred through
acquisitions, both inside and outside the pharmaceutical industry. Of partictilar
significance, US pharmaceutical companies diversified into non-prescription
medicines, consumer products such as cosmetics and sundries, and medical
equipment and diagnostic aids. Cool (1985) attributes these moves to the phar-
maceutical compatiies' ability to transfer technical knowledge and take advantage
of established distribution channels, as well as the hefty profit margins and
growth rates available in these markets.
To summarize, the 1962 changes in FDA regulation are seen by analysts as
leading to significant changes in the industry, including significant incretise in the
time and expense associated with bringing a new product to market and a
shorter effective patent life. These changes in the environment were reflected in
strategic change across the industry, including an increase in overseas expansion
and diversification into related businesses. Our questions were: (1) Could we
identify significant changes in the timing of such responses to the 1962 legislation?
(2) Could these changes be explained in terms of the theoretic ideas sunnmarized
in figure 1?
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Sample Selection
Selection of a homogeneous sample for the study was based on four criteria.
First, since the stimulus event was significant change in US regtilation, we
decided candidate firms had to be US-owned, with over 50 per cent of their
business conducted in the USA at the start of the study period. Second, all firms
in the sample had to have significant commitment (which we defined as over 50
per cent of US sales) to pharmaceutical manufacturing in 1962. Third, all
sample firms were required to have at least ten years of history in the pharma-
ceudcal industry prior to the beginning of the study period, to assure the
formation of relatively well-developed schemata, which at the ot^anizational level
we call 'strategic frames', prior to the change in legislation. Sample firms were
also required to be financially healthy at the time of the regulatory change, to
avoid confounding changes in strategic frames due to regulatory change with
responses to other performance concerns. Our criterion was that changes in prof-
itability do not differ significandy from the experience of the industry as a whole;
it was not necessary to be more specific, since financial performance in the study
period was not a discounting factor for any of the firms considered. Finally, suffi-
cient financial and textual data had to be available for analysis.
Due to the extensive coding requirements of the cause mapping methodology
described below, which we use to identify the strategic frames of each firm over
a minimum of seven years, the sample size had to be restricted to a relatively
small number of firms. For that reason, the sample was drawn from Forbes'
1962 list of the top ten US pharmaceutical companies. Of those ten, six manu-
facturers met the four criteria and thus make up the final study sample. These
firms are: Abbott Laboratories (Abbott), Merck and Company (Merck), Parke,
Davis and Company (Parke-Davis), Smith Kline and French (SKF), Charles
Pfizer (I*fizer), and Schering. Once the sample was identified, the next steps were
to identify the points in time in which significant changes in strategic action
occurred in each firm during the period of interest and to identify the strategic
frames of each firm for each year during the same time period. We then used
the outcomes of both processes to categorize firms as fast or slow responders and
to link the content of strategic frames to the timing of strategic change.
Points of Change in Strategic Action
Two preliminary analyses were reqtiired before the core questions of the study
could be addressed. The first involved identifying the timing of strategic change
in each sample firm. Following the definition of strategy proposed by Mintzberg
and Waters (1982), change in strategy was defined as a significant break in the
pattern of resource allocations made by the firm. Four variables associated with
industry trends following the 1962 amendments were selected as important indi-
cators of potential strategic change that could be tied to the effects of the amend-
ments: percentage of foreign assets to total assets, research and development
(R&X)) expenditures as a percentage of sales, selling expense as a percentage of
sales, and liquid to total assets.''^ Percentage of foreign assets to total assets was
assumed to reflect directly strategic orientation toward geographic expansion.
R&D as a percentage of sales was used as an indication of commitment to the
development of new ethical pharmaceuticals: an increase in this measure is a
likely indicator of increased investment due to the new testing requirements, a
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more diversified focus might be refiected in a decline in R&D as a percentage of
total sales. Selling expense as a percentage of sales is also a measure of product
emphasis; the marketing of pharmaceuticals required sales visits to physicians
that were typically more expensive than marketing over-the-counter remedies or
other consumer products. Lastly, liquid to total assets reflects significant changes
in capital expenditure. Historically, pharmaceutical manufacturers had been
fiscally conservative, funding capital expansion through internal funds. Shifts in
this measure following 1962 are primarily attributed by industry observers to the
significant increase in diversification via acquisition.
Data were coUected from published financial reports of each firm from the
period 1950 to 1970 20 years surrounding the change in regulation chosen for
study. Breakpoints indicating change in strategy along key dimensions were
identified through the use of cluster analysis, a procedure frequently used by
strategy researchers to identify strategic change (Hambrick, 1984; Harrigan,
1985; Smith and Crimm, 1987). Firms were analysed individually using Ward's
method of cluster analysis. This clustering method was considered the most
appropriate of the several that might have been used (SAS Institute Inc., 1990)
because it offers a straightforward translation of the idea of patterns in resource
allocation. Ward's method clusters data by minimizing variance vwthin clusters
and maximizing variance across clusters. The algorithm involved initially
separates the four measures for each year; it then joins clusters beginning with
those that explain the least variance by existing separately. The procedure
continues until all cases are joined in a single cluster. The researcher must
decide when the programme begins to join clusters with inappropriately high
variance, using the semipartial FT of each clustering iteration as an initial
indicator of the appropriate clustering solution (number of clusters) (Hartigan,
1976). A review o/ the output indicated that a semipartial K of greater than .1
represented a significant loss of explained variance in the next iteration of the
programme. The final determination of the number of clusters was made much
easier because of the easy interpretabiiity of the clusters themselves (Evritt, 1980).
No restrictions were placed on the algorithm to force sequential clusters. With
one exception, however, when the procedure was terminated the breakpoints
between clusters allowed them to be placed in longitudinal sequence, which
suggests that the selected variables do capture cohesive strategic decisions made
over time.
The one exception involved Parke-Davis. For this company, a significant drop
in sales, coinciding with an increase in asset expenditures, led to a significant dip
in liquid assets as a percentage of total from 1960 to 1963. This dip caused the
clustering algorithm to identify the 1957-59 cluster as being much more similar
to the 1964-69 cluster than to the 1960-63 cluster. Analysis of the remaining
three variables suggested, however, that it was reasonable to maintain the three
breakpoints involved, and thus the ultimate decision was that significant changes
in strategy occurred in 1957, 1960 and 1964.
Table I sutnmarizes the breaks identified in the pattern of each firm's strategic
decisions, along with the descriptive statistics used to guide our decisions. As
shown, the 1962 regulatory change coincided with the third or fourth strategic
change made by the sample firms during the 1952-70 .study period. Based on
the starred dates, we initially identified Merck and Parke-Davis as the fastest
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Table I. Initial categorization of firm responsiveness based on cluster analysis
Firm
Merck
Parke-Davis"
SKF
XWKT
Schering
Abbott
1st strai^
1952-57 (.582)*
1952-56 (.413)
1952-56 (.540)
1952-56 (.442)
1952-54 (.251)
1952-56 (.231)
2nd strat^
1958-63 (.115)
1957-59 (.210)
1957-64 (.207)
1957-60 (.211)
1955-58 (.373)
1957-60 (.439)
3rd strat^
1964*-70
1960-63 (.101)
1965*-70
1961-64 (.121)
1959-65 (.146)
1961-66 (.129)
4th strategy
l%4*-69
I965*-70
1966*-70
1967*-70
Notes:
"Parke-Davis was purchased by Wamcr-Lambcrt in 1970, and so the last cluster terminates in 1969.
Numbers in brackets are the semi-partial ft^s. This is the loss in explained variance that occurs if the cluster is
combined with the cluster to the H^t.
responders to legislative changes in 1962, with new strategic actions initiated in
1964. SKF and Pfizer, firms that show evidence of significant strategic change in
1965, were identified as midgroup responders. Schering and Abbott, with
changes in 1966 and 1967 respectively, were identified as the slowest two firms
to respond.
Identifying Strategic Frames
The second stage of preliminary analysis involved identifying the strategic frames
used by the top management team of each firm. This task posed its own metho-
dological challenges. Questionnaires can be used to ask about environmental and
strategic changes (e.g. Milliken, 1990; Smith and Grimm, 1987), but the very act
of asking an individual to reflect on an issue may cause his or her a priori inter-
pretations to be re-evaluated, a problem that becomes more acute as the events
of interest fall out of active memory (Golden, 1992). Real-time interviews avoid
the retrospective nature of questionnaires, but also stiffer from intervention
effects. In fact, face-to-face contact heightens the distorting human tendency to
impress the observer (Eden et al., 1993). Ethnographic approaches to the study
of changing interpretations provide a less obtrusive method of study (Bartunek,
1984; Meyer, 1982; Scheid-Cook, 1992), though impression management cannot
be discounted. In addition, these studies are even more time-consuming than
interviews and rely more heavily on subjective interpretations by the researcher.
We were attracted to studying a stressful event that occurred over thirty years
ago because the impact of the focal event and possible confounding effects were
easier to identify after the passage of time. None of the four methods just
described are very practical in this circumstance, however, and thus we were
drawn to a fourth methodological alternative, content analysis of documents
written during the period of interest. Documents are a real-time, non-intrusive
indicator of the interpretations of top managers that are especially attractive
when, as in this case, other data sources (interviews, questionnaires, direct obser-
vations, etc.) are not available. The basic assumption is that the subjects that
decision makers discuss in communications such as letters to shareholders reflect
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concerns of importance to the speaker. This assumption dates back to the first
recorded use of content analysis, an investigation of the heretical content of new
hymns in eighteenth-century Sweden (Woodrum, 1984).
Annual reports are the most obvious documentary data source for longitudinal
studies, since they are produced by many companies at the same time of the
year and they are readily available. In addition, we believe that annual reports
and other public documents are an important forum in which strategic frames
are articulated. They both reflect and help create needed commonalities in the
interpreution of events. Further, they have been used in past research to assess
and explain corporate strategies (Bowman, 1984; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989;
Fiol, 1989; Lant et al., 1992), to identify key arenas of competition (Bimbaum-
More and Weiss, 1990) and to explore causal reasoning within firms (Bettman
and Weitz, 1983; Clapham and Schwenk, 1991).
To expand the data set available from annual reports, we also tried to
locate public speeches made by representatives of the study firms in our study
period. None of the six firms was able to provide transcripts of speeches from
the time period studied. ^ '^ There were, however, a total of 19 speeches from
this time period published in the Wall Street Transcripts, a publication that
provides a full record of many executive speeches to securities analysts and
similar audiences. At least two speeches were available for each of the six
firms in the sample, with the exception of Schering, for which we found only
one.
The exact authorship of both letters to shareholders and speeches is open to
question, but when a shared strategic frame is the unit of analysis, ambiguity
about autborship of such documents is not particularly problematic. The notion
of epistemic community discussed earlier, and increased emphasis on the fact
that the leadership of larger organizations is dispersed among many individuals
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), make it plausible to use such documents as an
indicator of shared understanding.
Annual reports and speeches to analysts are more problematic because tbey
are persuasive documents and subject to deliberate distortion; but persuasion and
distortion accompany all possible data sources. We have noted already that
biased recall and impression management can have contaminating effects on
data drawn from questionnaires, interviews and participant observations. Even
accounting data and financial information can be slanted to present the firm in
the best possible light. While we recognize that annual reports and speeches are
explicitly persuasive, we echo Giere's (1988) argument that unrealistic theoretic
statements in science are constrained by a broad body of 'common observation'.
Securities analysts, institutional investors, the business press and the Securities
and Exchange Commission all constrain errors of commission and omission.
Salancik and Meindl (1984) present evidence that firms are rewarded for being
truthful in these circumstances. The bottom line is that we chose to study a set
of documents that are not the ideal indicator of shared belief, but no ideal data
source exists.
Despite their limitations, these documents provided a very interesting source of
data for study. Even before beginning detailed coding, initial analysis of state-
ments made in the documents for Pfizer, Abbott and Parke-Davis provided
insights that required a change in the original categorization of faster versus
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slower responders. (That is, we found we had an error rate of 50 per cent using
a method commonly used in strategy research to identify strategic change.)
Beginning with the general premise that topics covered in the letters to share-
holders and speech transcripts reflect issues of importance to top managers, we
looked for statements concerning the legislation and related events (hearings,
introductions of earlier versions of the legislation, etc.) in the documents of each
firm. Letters and speeches for Pfizer and Abbott during 1959-61 contained
several statements concerning senate investigations of the industry and the intro-
duction of the Kefauver bill in early 196lJ^ Pfizer letters and speeches following
the 1962 change in legislation make no mention of it. Abbott continued to
mention the legislation but only as a side issue; statements concerning the
potential change in legislation during the 1959-61 time period were much more
frequent and substantial tiian statements made after 1961. In short, the 1965
change in action for Pfizer and 1967 change for Abbott appear not to be
direcdy related to the new legislation that provided the stimulus event for this
study. Content analysis indicates that both firms made a proactive response to
initial legislative moves rather than wait for the actual enactment of the legisla-
tion in 1962. This conclusion was corroborated by a systematic study of business
press and industry articles about each firm during this same time period. Both
companies therefore were recategorized as faster responders.
A review of the content of Parke-Davis documents was even more interesting.
The data reveal no references to regulatory issues over the entire study period.
This company's statements were focused on relative lack of R&ID productivity
and declining sales of Chloromycetin, their primary product. Complete lack of
attention to legislative events, combined with numerous statements made
regarding R&D, suggest that tiieir 1964 change in strategy was not strongly
motivated by the legislative change that interested us as a stressful event. This
firm was therefore excluded from comparative assessment of response to stressful
legislation. Of course, Parke-Davis did compete in an environment almost all
other observers felt was significantly restricted by new legislation. This environ-
ment presumably had an impact on the outcome, if not the formulation, of their
strategy. It is well to remember, however, that even 'major' changes in the envir-
onment do not have a homogeneous effect on all firms.
Given the cross-check of quantitative measures of change in allocation of
strategic resources with qualitative content pertaining to government actions, our
final classification is shown in table 11. Pfizer and Abbott are identified as fast
responders to new regulation with 1961 changes in strategic action anticipating
1962 legislation. Merck, SKF and Schering are classified as slower responders
with changes in action occurring in 1964, 1965 and 1966, respectively. Parke-
Davis must be analysed separately and is addressed in the discussion section of
this paper.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE INTERPRETrVE PRECURSORS TO STRATEGIC CHANGE
Once it was clear that there were significant differences in the timing of response
to 1962 regulatory changes among pharmaceutical firms, we wanted to
determine if these responses could be explained in terms of the theoretic ideas
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Table II. Re-assignment of firms based on content analysis
Response time Name of firm Years Description
Faster response Pfizer
Abbott
Slower response Merck
SKF
Schering
1957-60 Intemal product bne expansion.
Intemal foreign expansion
1961-64 Diversification via acquisition.
Foreign expansion via acquisidon
1957-60 Internal product line expansion.
Intemal foreign expansion
1961-66 Product line expansion via
acquisition. Diversification via
acquisition. Continued foreign
expansion
1958-63 Intemal product Une expansion.
limited foreign expansion
1964-70 Diversification via acquisidon.
limited foreign expansion
1957-64 Intemal product line expansion
1965-70 Foreign expansion. Diversificadon
via acquisidon
1959-65 Intemal foreign expansion. Intemal
product Une expansion
1966-70 Product line expansion via
acquisidon. Diversificadon via
acquisidon. Foreign expansion via
joint-venture acquisidon
Non-response Parke-Davis
summarized in figure 1. The figure suggested three poitits at which the interpre-
tive processes of faster responding firms tnight be significantly different from
slower firms. Faster firms might: (1) more rapidly notice changes in the environ-
ment; (2) more quickly interpret changes as significant; or (3) more quickly
detennine that the stress associated with the new event merited action. Differ-
ences at even one of these points might explain differences in the timing of
strategic action; alternatively, faster firms might be distinguished from slower
firms by multiple indicators of difference. To address these issues we looked
more closely at statements made in annual reports and the Wall Street Transcripts.
Causal Mapping Methodobgy
Of the several procedures available to systematically content analyse written
documents (Huff, 1990), we chose to focus on causal reasoning under the
assumption that firms typically initiate strategic actions based on the shared
belief that they will cause desirable changes; many other organization researchers
have made the same assumpdon (e.g. Allard Poesi, 1994; Barr et al., 1992;
Bougon et al., 1977; Eden, 1993; Ehlinger, 1994; Jenkins, 1994; Laukkanen,
1994; Markoczy and Goldberg, 1995; Narayanan and Fahey, 1990; Salancik and
Meindl, 1984; Shrivastava and Iin, 1984). The method of 'cause mapping' we
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Table III. Coding categories
Symbol D^inition
/+/ Positively affects
/ — / Negatively affects
/0/ Will not hurt, does not prevent, is not harmful to
/ © / Will not help, does not promote, is of no benefit to
i^ lif- May or may not he related to, affects indeterminably
/ m / Affects in some non-zero way
/O/ Does not matter for, has no affect on, has no relation
/ = / Is an equivalent to, is defined as*
/ e / Is an example of, is one member of*
Mte:
*Categoric8 not used by Axelrod.
used was initially developed by Axelrod (1976) and elaborated by Htiff et al.
(1990). The process is dme-consuming, but the restilting maps provide a parsimo-
nious synthesis of a great deal of material.
The procedure requires that all statements of relationship in the document
analysed be identified by the coder. The nature of the relationship is placed into
one of the nine categories identified in table IIL After all relational statements
have been identified, the linked concepts are examined. Those judged to be
equivalent are given the same code. A cause map is then constructed by connect-
ing coded concepts with arrows and labelling the arrows with the appropriate
symbol for the type of relationship. As a simple example; the sentence 'Substan-
tial construction was undertaken in 1961 for the manufacture of new products as
well as increased capacity to meet rising demands for established ones', would be
coded as follows:
Substantial construction ' + [ability to] manufacture new products
undertaken in 1961 (l.a) (l.b)
Substantial construction + [ability to] meet rising demand for
undertaken in 1961 (l.a) established products (l.c)
and then represented in graphical form as shown below:
+ [ability to] manufacture new products (1 .b)Substantial construction
undertaken in 1961 (l.a)
+ [ability to] meet rising demand for
established products (l.c)
The coding manual also makes provisions for linkages that are not directly
stated, but are implied by context. These coder decisions are distinguished on
the map by use of a dotted, rather than a solid arrow. In addition, sometimes
the ultimate effect of a chain of reasoning is implied rather than explicit. The
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coding procedure therefore allows the coder to specify a positive or negative
impact on the 'utility' of some actor or entity. AU inferences, even linking words
such as those in the above example, are indicated by brackets, which signify a
departure from the source material.
The documents utilized for coding in this study were the 42 letters to share-
holders (UTS) from the annual reports for each firm from 1960 to 1966 (one
year prior to the earliest response among the firms and one year after the latest
response) and transcripts of the eight speeches recorded in the Wall Street Tran-
script {WST) (out of 19) that included references to government legislation. Letters
to shareholders averaged two 8.5" x U " typed pages of text while the WSTs
averaged six 8.5" x 11" typed pages. In total, approximately 132 pages of text
were coded. Comparisons of maps from both data sources show consistency in
causal assertions for all six firms studied, a consistency in causal reasoning also
found by Axelrod (1976) and his associates. Material from the H 5^T" speeches
was therefore added to LTS of the same year.
Document coding was performed by two independent research assistants
unaware of the research questions. Each coder was trained separately in the
coding process by the first author. Two WST speeches from sample firms were
coded by both coders to ascertain intercoder reliability. These texts were among
the longest and most complicated documents to be coded, consisting of 122 total
statements. Based on Robinson's (1957) measure of agreement, which is also
used by Axelrod (1976), intercoder agreement on the number of codable asser-
tions was 82 per cent. This is a reasonable degree of reliability, though not
outstanding; the differences between coders, however, were primarily due to two
sentences with particularly subtle causal assertions. Had the coders agreed on
these two statements, reliability would have been 89 per cent, well within the
range of acceptability. Agreement on which part of the statement contained the
causal concept was 98 per cent. Identification of the part of the statement
containing the effect was 97 per cent. Agreement as to the sign of the causal
relationship was 88 per cent, with most differences involving subtle signs such as
'no effect on' and 'no negative effect on'.
Once training was satisfactorily established, the remaining documents were
divided between the coders, who completed all coding independently. In
analysing the results we were guided by the three questions drawn from figure 1:
(1) Do firms that quickly take action more rapidly identify changes in their
environments? (2) Do they more quickly interpret unfamiliar stimuli as
important?, and/or (3) do they more rapidly identify stressful consequences of
new stimuli?
Finding 1: Faster firms could not be distinguished from other firms in our data
set by their attention to legislation change.
The most straightforward link between the interpretation of an event and new
strategic action is direct stimulus-response. That is, the most basic hypothesis
relevant to our interest in the length of time it takes firms to respond to environ-
ment change would be that the strategic frame used by faster responding firms
will contain references to a precipitating environmental event prior to slower
responding firms. Figure 1 proposes, however, that the simple process of noticing
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significant changes in the environment is not in and of itself a sufficient trigger
for adaptive changes in strategy.
In analysing the maps in the data set, any and all concepts dealing with
proposed or actual legislation were identified, regardless of how they were
connected to other concepts. Because the faster responders changed in 1961,
both the 1960 and 1961 maps for all sample firms were analysed. The maps of
both early and late responders make references to the proposed legislation as
early as 1960. Only Parke-Davis, as noted above, failed to attend to either the
pending legislation or to its enactment.
Finding 2: A necessary condition for strategic actions in our sample is that firms
perceive their welfare is directly affected by environmental change.
As indicated in table II, the faster firms (Pfizer and Abbott) actually responded
in 1961, prior to the 1962 change in legislation. Therefore, the 1961 cause maps
of each firm are examined. These maps show that the proposed change in legis-
lation is directly linked to concepts aifecting firm performance and well-being in
the faster responding firms. In analysing tbe maps, strength of association was
determined by the type of linkage (a direct, stated association, versus an indirect,
implied association), the strength of the linkage code {e.g. + and — versus ©
and ©) and the number of linkages between the concepts surrounding the new
legislation and concepts about performance and well-being (the greater the
number of linkages, the stronger the association).
The 1961 cause map of Pfizer {excerpted in figure 2) can be used to illustrate
the type of associations displayed. The bill itself (concept 47e) has a total of nine
linkages to Pfizer utility (Ib) and Pfizer's growtb (2g). In addition to the seven
direct linkages to Pfizer utility (47m.l-47m.3; 47n.l-47n.4), the bill is seen as an
example of govemment actions which, in tum, are causing both problems and
opportunities for the firm, of which Pfizer is 'aware' {47h and 47j) and is
'preparing for' (47i and 47k). These preparations are seen as having a direct and
positive effect on Pfizer's growth (a performance measure). Abbott's maps reflect
similar causal associations between the proposed legislation and firm perfor-
mance. In this company's 1961 map, the proposed legislation is directly linked to
firm utility and to R&D, a concept that is in tum linked directly and strongly to
measures of firm performance.
The 1961 maps of the three slower responding firms do not exhibit this type
of association. The cause map of Schering does not contain any concepts related
to the legisladon. Merck's map contains concepts related to the senate subcom-
mittee investigation of the pharmaceutical industry that preceded the introduc-
tion of the legislation, but not to the legislation itself. While this map does
demonstrate an understanding of the implications of the investigation, the
implications are all linked to industry utility. There is no connection between the
investigation and concepts related to firm specific performance. Finally, SKF's
map also contains legislation concepts but, like Merck, this understanding is not
related to firm-specific performance or well-being.
We then looked at the 1962 maps of the slower responding firms. If significant
connections between legislation concepts and measures of firm performance
existed as soon as the bill was adopted, the assertion that a distinguishing charac-
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teristic of rapidly responding firms is a strategic frame with strong and direct
links between the 1962 legislation and measures of firm performance would be
undermined. However, once again firms that were slower to respond did not
relate aspects of change in their environment to concepts concerning organiza-
tion performance or well-being, even after the stressful event had taken place.
The relevant portion of the 1962 map of SKF (figure 3) illustrates this finding.
In this map SKF is 'prepared to speak out against any such legislation* {25o) that
it equates with being 'unnecessary or restrictive...' {25q}, but these concepts are
not connected in any way to firm utility or measures of performance. The event
(25k) is also expected to have some effect (m) on the industry (251) and the cost
of doing business (24fl) yet it is not expected to increase (@) alarm over SKF
profitability {25n.2) or growth (25n.l). Schering's interpretation of the new
amendments is also unrelated to firm performance or utility. In 1961 this firm
did not address impending legislation; by 1962 concepts related to the new
amendments are seen as having a negative association with industry utility, but
they are not interpreted as direcdy affecting the firm itself.
The 1962 map of Merck differs somewhat from the two just described. In
Merck's 1962 map (figure 4), legislation is weakly linked to firm performance or
well-being at two points. First, the legislation 'if properly administered' (18a.l) is
New provisions of
the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic
Act l2Dk)
®
©
(Challenge of
further government
control (251)
The prescription
drug industry (251)
The extent of the
increase in the cost
of doing business
(241.1)
Alarm so far as
the profitability
ofSKF{25n.'2)
/\larm so far
as the growth
ofSKF(25n.l)
SKF prepare to
speak out against
any such legislation
(25o)
.Any unnecessary or
restriciive legislation
that [SKF] believes may
impede the flow of new
and useful drugs (2.'iq)
Note: Amendment and performance concepts are boxed with thick lines.
Figure 3. Portion of SKF 1962 cause map
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The new legislation
enacted by Congress
If properly
itdministered.
Regulations issued
bvtheFDA(18a.^)
0
•I riie j)rngress of Merck (18b) I
Tlie new legislation
Lind regulations (!8(.)
The greatly added
medical LUUI scit'ntilic
responsibilities oi the
FDA(18d)
Increase in Merck's
expenses (4c) [McTck
Note,: Amendment and performance concepts are boxed with thick lines.
Figure 4. Portion of Merck 1962 cause map
weakly linked by a 'does not have a negative affect on' code (0) to 'the progress
of Merck' (18b), an implied performance indicator. This weak causal link is a
more peripheral connection between the stimulus event and firm performance
than found in the rapidly responding firms. It is also weak when compared to
the stronger linkages odier concepts have to performance measures in the
complete map. A second relevant link comes from the expectation that legislation
will increase company expenses (4c), a concept that is in turn directly linked to
firm utility (3g). However, given that the regulation itself is not interpreted as
significantly affecting the progress of the firm, this single link does not suggest
that the legislation is interpreted as significantly affecting this measure of perfor-
mance.
In sum, the maps, taken as an indictor of strategic frames, indicate that
attention was being paid to the 1962 change in legislation by all five responding
firms. However, slower responding firms do not initially interpret new regulation
as affecting firm level performance or well-being in any significant way, while
firms responding more quickly do interpret those changes as having a direct
impact on firm performance and well-being. To use Milliken's (1987, 1990)
term, there was no 'state uncertainty' for pharmaceutical firms in the early
1960s. It appears from the data that the slower firms were well aware of new
legislation, but did not understand or believe its implications until much later
than their competitors.
A recent empirical study by Barr et al. (1992) provides empirical support for
the importance of this additional interpretive step. In this study of two raihoad
companies facing increasing competition, it was found that both companies
quickly noticed changes in the transportation industry in the period following
World War II. However, only the firm that survived into the 1970s linked
BlackweU PubUshen Ud 1997
358 PAMELA S. BARR AND ANNE S. HUFF
changing conditions to a need to change their own strategy. The second firm
noticed and discussed changes in the environment, but failed to interpret them
as requiring action. This company delayed changing its strategy, suffered
financial decline and eventually went bankrupt. Taken together, it appears
reasonable to conclude that it is interpretation rather than noticing that plays the
most important role in triggering strategic adaptation; noticing appears to be a
necessary but not sufficient precursor to change. Firms must not only recognize
a new event in the environment, they must understand its connection to their
own activities. In fact, our data suggests that even more connections must be
made before action is likely.
Finding 3: Firms do not act until they identify multiple effects of environmental
change and these effects are supported by other indicators of the need for
strategic change.
The third focus of attention in this study is the amount of stress created by an
external event before strategic change occurs. Two scenarios are suggested by
research on the causes of continuing inertia. First it may be that a single
perceived consequence of an external event is not sufficient to significandy
change performance expectations for the firm. At the individual level it has been
argued that actors are not completely open to developing new ideas for action
because so much of the individual's identity and activity are based on current
understandings (Anderson et al., 1980; Ross et al., 1975). The general consensus
is that there must be significant modification in understanding before adjustments
in activity are made. Analogous reasoning at the organization level suggests that
a change in the environment may have to be interpreted as having many signifi-
cant connections to concepts of firm performance and/or well-being.
Our data support the idea, formalized in figure 1, that attention to multiple
direct effects of the environment must precede strategic change. To investigate
this idea, the maps from the three years up to and including the year of change
in strategic action were examined for each of the five responding firms. The 1962
legislation was considered to have multiple direct effects if there was more than
one direct linkage to concepts about firm performance or well-being. All five firms
exhibited such linkages. Once again the 1961 map of Pfizer (figure 2) is illustra-
tive. The Kefauver bill (47e) contains proposals that Pfizer opposes (47d) as well
as some that Pfizer supports (47b). Leading from these concepts are seven aspects
of the bill that are interpreted as having strong direct effects on Pfizer's utility (lb).
The remaining maps provide less dramatic support for the idea that identify-
ing multiple impacts will precede strategic change. Table IV lists each firm and
the number of linkages between legislative concepts and firm performance and
well-being in each year analysed. As shown, Abbott's change in strategy in 1961
is accompanied by two links between legislation and the firm. SKF and Merck
each establishes two links the year before new actions take place. Schering makes
two such connections in 1964, but does not change strategy until 1966.
A second scenario about the type of stress that must precede strategic change
involves the linkage between a stressful event and other events that are also
perceived to have an impact on performance. If one event is perceived to have
relatively few direct connections to firm performance, it may have to be seen in
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Table IV. Number of linkages between legislative concepts and measures of
performance and well-being
Merck
SKF
Pfizer
Schering
Abbott
I960
0
0
1961
7
2
1962
0
1963
2
0
1964
0
2
2
1965
0
0
1966
0
association with other events that also impact performance measures before
strategic change occurs. In examining this idea, the maps for the three years up
to and including the year of change in strategic action were again analysed. All
concepts with a strong, direct link to measures of firm performance or well-being
were traced back to their concept of origin and these concepts were examined
for connections to the new legislation.
The overall results of this analysis are that multiple maps exhibit the presence of more
than one triggering event before a change in strategi£ action. This is a finding that strongly
supports the idea that stress must accumulate before strategic change occurs
(Huff et al., 1992). The 1964 map of SKF (figure 5) illustrates the kind of
reasoning involved. The map shows three event interpreted by firm management
as impacting SKF utility (lg). First, as discussed earlier, the 1962 amendments
(25k) affect utility through a decline in new medicines (26i) brought on by
increased paperwork (26h.2) and approval times (26k). A second, related event is
the withdrawal, by the FDA, of SKF's drug Pamate (28i). This is related to the
new regulations by a common relationship to the FDA because all paperwork
for drug approval is submitted to the FDA. Also related to the FDA and SKF
utility is 'new regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Weliare'
(25o), which increase the administrative problems 'now harassing the FDA and
the industry' (29a). In short, as the firm changes its strategy, three different
events, all related to FDA activities, are interpreted as having strong negative
links to the utility of the firm.
As a summary of the other data supporting this finding, table V lists each
sample firm and the related events found in the maps immediately prior to that
firm's change in strategic action. All concepts were related through some form of
government institution or action. It must be noted that it was not until 1965,
one year afler the change in strategy we identified through examining the
pattern of resource allocation, that Merck's maps indicate concern with any
other issues. However, the maps do reveal that those issues are connected to a
long-standing concern over 'continuing government intervention' in the industry
that may indicate some unstated concern with these other events prior to 1965.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to use the ideas of strategic frames and stress and
inertia to explore the temporal relationship between firm level interpretation of
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Table V. Related events by firm
Firm Events
Merck 1962 Amendment, Medicare 1965, 'other far-reaching legislation' 1965
SKF 1962 Amendment, withdrawal of Pamate (major product) by the
government 1964, changes in HEW regulations 1964
Pfizer Delany Food Additives Amendment 1958, Government contracts with
foreign firm for tetracycline (a Pfizer patented product) 1960, 1961 proposed
amendment (Kefauver bill)
Schering 1962 Amendment, overseas regulatory changes 1964, Medicare, 1965
Abbott Detany Food Additives Amendment 1958, Proposed change in taxation of
overseas earnings 1961, 1961 proposed amendment (Kefauver bill)
an important environmental event and significant changes in strategy. We began
by referring to the basic tenet of strategic management that firms should alter
their strategies to adapt to new conditions, but noted that there exists wide
variation in the timing of such an adjustment across firms in the same industry
(Ginsberg and Buchholtz, 1990; Haveman, 1992; Smith and Grimm, 1987).
Many models of strategic change and problem formuladon include a trigger
which sets the process of change in motion (Ginsberg, 1988; Lyles, 1981;
Mintzberg et al., 1976). However, the nature of the triggering process has not
been well defined. This study significantly expands our understanding of the trig-
gering or timing of strategic response by suggesting that response is closely linked
to changes in interpretation that appear in the strategic frames of the organiza-
tion. How a newly recognized event is incorporated into the strategic frame, in
particular how it relates to the performance of the firm and to other events that
impact performance, is more closely associated with variations in the timing of
strategic response across firms than noticing the event. In other words, the old
strategic frames, which are unlikely to hold concepts corresponding to a new
environmental event, must change in quite specific ways before new action is
initiated. Further, the types of changes in interpretation identified through the
maps are consistent with extant theories of stress and inertia as factors in the
dming of change.
Several studies have sought to invesdgate the potential of cognitive maps to
both provide insights for theory development and to aid management pracdce.
Use of cognidve mapping for theory development has, for example, revealed
correlations between industry structure and managers' understanding of the
environment (Calori et al., 1994; Porac et al., 1989; Reger and Huff, 1993) and
between cognitive maps and firm performance (Barr et al., 1992; Hall, 1984).
Mapping techniques have also been used to aid managers in problem resolution
and strategic planning by highlighting previously unstated, or unrecognized,
beliefs (e.g. Eden, 1990, 1993).
In this study, we utilize mapping techniques to identify organization level
beliefs (strategic frames) and then identify patterns of change in these maps that
refiect changes in noticing and interpretation. Our results reveal a temporal rela-
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tionship between these patterns of change in maps and changes in strategic
action, and thus represent an important step forward in our understanding of
the link between interpretation and action.
The changes in strategic frames associated with the timing of strategic change
identified in this study are directly consistent with stress and inertia theories of
change which suggest that inertial forces that build in firms over time work to
prevent second order change until they are surpassed by higher levels of stress
{Ginsberg, 1988; Huff et al., 1992). The data indicate that stress may follow
from either or both of two types of strategic frame characteristics. First, the inter-
preted strength of the impacts of the event on the firm appears to be moderately
important to the timing of response. The maps of all of the five responding firms
exhibited multiple links between amendment concepts and firm performance
prior to strategic change, suggesting that the event was interpreted as having a
very strong impact on the firm. Further, while the maps of faster responding
firms did not exhibit stronger links between the event and firm performance
than slower responding firms, they did exhibit multiple links prior to the slower
firms. This suggests that strength of impact, represented in this study by the
number of perceived impacts on the firm, is an important trigger to change.
Another observation related to stress involves the effect of multiple events. The
five firms in our sample related the change in legislation to several other events,
all of which exhibited direct links to firm performance or well-being prior to
changing strategy. The immediate implication of these results is that these
multiple linkages refiect increased levels of stress that are likely to surpass existing
levels of inertia and trigger change. Because change did not occur until after
these links appeared in the maps, it adds to the argument that stress is a
necessary component to the triggering of change.
A broader implication of these results is that strategy researchers must look
more closely at what we mean by the term 'response'. First, we found a very
large discrepancy between quantitative and qualitative indicators of strategic
change. Second, more detailed analysis of the maps suggested that strategic
actions which might easily be attributed to widely recognized changes in the
industry were not necessarily made in response to legislation alone. Rather,
change in strategy can be linked to the effects of numerous, related events. For
example, early responders undertook a change in strategy prior to actual
enactment of the 1962 version of the bill. It was the introduction of an earlier
version of the bill that, combined with the perceived impacts of other prior
government events, increased the pressure for change beyond the level of inertia.
Late responders, whose maps indicated no prior concern regarding government
actions prior to the change in legislation, did not change strategy until the occur-
rence of additional governmental actions which were linked, in the maps, to firm
performance.
The 'non-response' of Parke-Davis also highlights the importance of related
events and trends to organizational response. As noted earlier, the maps of
Parke-Davis suggest that their 1964 change in strategy was not strongly
motivated by legislative change. Rather, concepts related to performance and
well-being during the time were concerned with R&D, a lack of new product
development (NPD), and declining sales of their primary product. Parke-Davis'
R&D efforts had not resulted in a significant new product since the late 1950s.
C> BlackweU Publishers Ltd 1997
SEEING ISNT BEUEVING 363
Further, 43 per cent of sales in 1960 was from a single product, Chloromycetin,
which was due to come ofT patent in 1966, and was already suffering declines in
sales overseas where patent protection was less strictly enforced. Certainly the
lack of NPD could have been exacerbated by the change in legislation.
However, because the 'event' of a lack of NPD began prior to 1962, the effect
from the legislation was, perhaps, made less salient. In fact, the 1964 change in
strategy undertaken by this firm, an increase in diversificadon, is not accompa-
nied by changes in map concepts related to the external environment. This
suggests that the change in strategy was less a response to a change in the
external environment than it was a response to trends in the internal environ-
ment - the continued lack of NPD coupled with the impending loss of patent
protection on, and declining sales of, their primary product. While Parke-Davis
may not have 'responded' to the change in legisladon, it is interesting that its
maps are consistent with the theory of interpretation and change suggested by
the maps of the other five firms. Before strategic change, three concepts (R&D,
NPD and patents) in the maps are strongly and direcdy linked to Parke-Davis'
performance and well-being. Further, concepts related to both R&D and
concerns about Chloromycetin can be traced back to lack of NPD; differential
issues with a common root.
In general, the results of analysis of the maps from all firms suggest that
actions undertaken following a significant event in the environment are not just
a response to that event. Rather, strategic change responds to a perceived trend
in the environment, in this case increased governmental action in the external
environment or a lack of NPD in the internal environment, that impacts firm
performance. Although beyond the scope of this study, action may also reflect
the constellation of external stakeholders who are making their own interpreta-
tion of these events. The experience of early responders may also play a role,
though this influence is not explicit in the data set we used. These complexides
are consistent not only with stress/inertia theories of strategic change, but also
with other theories which suggest significant changes in strategy are undertaken
in response to shifts in the environment in general, while response to specific
events is limited to activities of a more tacdcal nature (Meyer, 1982).
Several questions are raised by this study that serve as directions for continued
research on the link between strategic frames and strategic response. First, why
the strategic frames of some firms quickly associated environmental change with
performance concepts while others did not is unclear from our analysis. We
purposely selected an event for study that was specifically designed to impact the
manner in which all members of the industry operated. Thus, one would expect
a greater consistency across firms in their realization that this event would
impact their firm than, perhaps, would be expected in response to less overarch-
ing events, such as moves made by competitors (Porac et al., 1989). It may be
that some organizations, because of their history, the prior experiences of top
management, or the infonnation processing capacity of the top management
team (Thompson and MeDaniel, 1990) have more complex strategic frames with
more linkages to performance issues. This complexity should increase the likeli-
hood that a major event will be conceptually linked to performance and well-
being. It may also be that frequent, though minor, changes in strategic
behaviour enhance the complexity of strategic frames and make it more likely
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that new stimuli can be interpreted in terms of strategic action (Hedberg et al.,
1976).
A second question raised by the study is related to the type of data we used to
construct the maps. Clearly, the firms in our sample differ in the way in which
they interpret the new legislation, especially the aspects of the legislation that are
highlighted as onerous, or stressful. But it also is interesting to step back, and
consider these differences in light of the data sources used. Since the source
documents are speeches and annual reports designed to communicate with
multiple audiences, diversity in response may also reflect this diversity in
audience, or firm stakeholders. In other words, our finding that multiple indicators
of pressure on the firm precedes action could be as much an effort to persuade
multiple stakeholders of the need for change (or respond to multiple demands for
change) as it is an indication of internal sensemaking alone. The observations are
beyond the scope of the study, but well worth further investigation. Complicated
conditions of sensemaking only add to our interest in the problem of timing, and
underscore the potential significance of the patterns we found.
Finally, another interesting sensemaking complication lies in the observation
that the slower responding firms may be learning from the faster responding
firms. Because only the largest firms in the industry were selected for study, all
the firms had the resources to wait and observe the experiences of others prior
to forming their own strategies. Such an explanation for timing differences is
consistent with the notion of industry recipes and industry influences proposed
by Spender (1989) and Huff (1982), but it is not inconsistent with the premise
that interpretation impacts the timing of response. It is certainly possible, in fact
likely, that the 'borrowed experiences' (Huff, 1982) of faster responding firms
might aid managers of the slower firms in forming their own interpretations,
though there is no explicit reference to such influences in the data sources we
used. Mimetic behaviour is of interest to institution theorists (e.g. DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983), but we also need further enquiry into the conditions that
encourage some firms to relate environmental change to their welfare without
such examples.
CONCLUSION
-. < -
Establishing the links between interpretation and action is frequently called for
(Walsh, 1995) but only recently tackled by research on managerial and organiza-
tion cognition. Previous research has suggested that the type of strategic change
made by a firm is linked to managerial interpretation of the environment
(Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Thomas et al., 1993).
This study addresses the issue of the timijig of strategic response to environmental
change. Our results suggest that the timing of change involves more than just
assigning meaning to a particular event. Consistent with work on individual
cognition (Isabella, 1990), the results show that events that are not interpreted as
affecting central concepts (performance or well-being) in the firm's strategic
frame do not lead to a change in action. Further, change appears to be triggered
by interpretations that link a given event to other concurrent or prior events,
consistent with stress/inertia theories of change.
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Finally, it may appear that our analysis counters suggestions by Weick (1979),
Starbuck and Milliken (1988) and others that managers act first and interpret
their actions later. However, we suggest the results of this study point to an
important middle ground between researchers who are interested in the purpose-
ful, deliberate development of strategy and those who fee! that strategy is more
often an outcome of action. The changes in interpretation we identify here focus
on an important interpretive step before change can take place: the realization
that something needs to be done. Theories of institutional inertia and evolutionary
theories of organization change we summarized provide needed insight into why
this interpretive step is not taken without significant pressure to do so. Additional
study of strategic frames and their relationship to the content of strategic
response may provide a more clear picture of enactment processes, and poses an
interesting avenue for future research. What our study suggests is that firms need
a map in which they have confidence, before they undertake a major journey
(Weick, 1990); they must 'know something' before they act. With this confidence,
they then 'see what they do', and develop more detailed knowledge of new
terrain in the way that Weick, Starbuck and others have been describing.
NOTES
•Presented at the 1992 Strategic Management Society Meeting, London, 14-17
October. This work draws significantly from the first author's dissertation. Support from
the Richard D. Irwin Foundation, and the input of the dissertation committee is grate-
fully acknowledged.
[I] A fifth variable, R&D emphasis on specific therapeutic categories of drugs, was also
identified as a significant strategic variable. However, relevant firm-level information
is not publicly available and therefore this dimension of strategy could not be investi-
gated.
[2] All six companies were contacted about the availability of historical documents, but
only two have promising repositories. To ensure equal level of documentation for
each firm, documents from these two firms were not used in this analysis.
[3] The Kefauver bill referred to in this text is the original bill submitted to committee
early in 1961. The two main provisions of this early version were compulsory licen-
sing of new drugs after three years, and the requirement that new drugs be effica-
cious in use, as well as safe. This bill died in committee in 1962.
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